Abstract-In a recent paper [C.H. Hong et al., Opt. Commun. 283 (2010) 2644], a n-user quantum key distribution protocol with n quantum channels was presented. By analyzing its security, it is shown that this protocol is insecure for Trent, a dishonest third party, who can steal the key without being detected by a special attack strategy. We give a description of this strategy and then put forward an improved protocol, which can stand against this attack. Furthermore, the improved protocol is feasible in the current technology conditions, because it is just required an incomplete Bell-state measurement in implementation of it.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the most important applications in the field of quantum information. In contrast to classical cryptography, the security of QKD is guaranteed by elementary principles of quantum mechanics, and therefore QKD has the unconditional security in theory. As a result, QKD has attracted a lot of attention, and has processed quickly [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] , since the first QKD protocol was proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [9] .
Recently, a n-user quantum key distribution (MQKD) protocol was presented [8] , which is called the Hong protocol hereinafter. In this protocol, there are n users and a third party (Trent) . With the help of Trent, any two parties (Alice and Bob) among these legal users can establish a secure quantum channel, via which they are able to perform key distribution between them. Utilizing the principle of entanglement swapping, only n quantum channels are required to achieve this aim in the Hong protocol, while the number of channels generally required is n(n-1)/2 in this case. Moreover, the authors of Ref. [8] analyzed the security of the Hong protocol and thought that it is secure. However, we will show that by a special strategy Trent can attain the key alone without introducing any errors in the Hong protocol.
II. THE ORIGINAL HONG PROTOCOL
Now, let us review briefly the Hong protocol. Before this, for the sake of convenience, we define an EinsteinPodolsky-Rosen (EPR) pair which is in one of the four Bell states as follows: 
Here, the subscripts i and j indicate two qubits in an entangled pair, and ⊕ represents addition modulo 2.
In the Hong protocol, according to her secret {0,1} a ∈ Trent. Here, the particular process to ensure the security of the channel between Trent and Alice (Bob) is not important to us, so we do not describe it in detail. After that, Trent performs a Bell state measurement on the qubits T A and T B , which discriminate these two particles is in the state , and sends the measurement result to Alice. In terms of the rule of entanglement swapping [10, 11] , we know that the qubits A and B are also collapsed onto a corresponding Bell state. These possible results can be found through the following process: In the Hong protocol, the eavesdropping check process is proposed to ensure its security. Hence, the success of this attack relies on Trent's announcement, which cannot introduce any errors in the eavesdropping attack. Next, it is shown that this attack cannot be detected in the check.
After the qubit T B is measured by Trent, the qubits T A , T B and A is in the state (5) with Eq.(3), it can be deduced that Trent's announcement cannot introduce any errors in the eavesdropping check. That is to say, Trent is able to obtain the sharing key by the proposed attack strategy and the Hong protocol is insecure.
IV. THE IMPROVED PROTOCOL
Before giving a possible improved protocol, it should be noted that generation and measurement of two Bell states is sufficient in the Hong protocol. Since the complete Bellstate measurement has to fail due to low efficiency in practice, this feature is worthwhile and valuable in implementation of the Hong protocol. Thus, in designing the improved protocol, How to retain this feature should be considered. Now, for the sake of convenience, the whole procedure of the improved protocol is depicted as follows.
(1) In terms of her secret "a 1 ,…, a n , ai∈{0,1}", Alice According to Eq. (6), it is obvious that these two results should satisfy the following condition. . From Eq. (7), it is clear that ka i =kb i . In this way, Alice and Bob can share a common random key with the help of Trent. Next, we make a brief security analysis on the improved protocol. In the transmission of the sequences S TA and S TB , the improved protocol utilize the same method as the original Hong protocol to ensure the security of the transmission. Hence, the quantum channel is secure, in accordance with the security analysis in Ref. [8] . To stand against the present attack, we make a modification in Bob's side, which requires Bob execute the same action as Alice. In this way, the initial state of the EPR pair prepared by Bob in step (3) becomes unknown for Trent. Hence, it is evident that the dishonest Trent could not use the proposed attack strategy to eavesdrop the key.
V. SUMMARIES
In summary, we found that the n-user quantum key distribution protocol presented in Ref. [8] may have a security leak and proposed a special eavesdropping strategy for Trent, the dishonest third party, who helps any two users construct the quantum channel between them. With this attack, Trent can elicit the key freely and fully. Moreover, we put forward a possible way for improving the security of this protocol. In the improved protocol, an incomplete Bellstate measurement is adopted, which allows one to identify two Bell states. Consequently, as compared to the protocol with complete Bell-state measurement proposed in Ref. [12] , the improved protocol is more feasible in the current technology conditions.
